This paper presents a formal epistemic framework for dynamic games in which players, during the course of the game, may revise their beliefs about the opponents' utility functions. We impose two key conditions upon the players' beliefs: (a) throughout the game, every move by the opponent should be interpreted as a rational move, and (b) the belief about the opponents' relative utilities between two terminal nodes should only be revised if you are sure that the opponent has decided to avoid one of these nodes. Common belief about these events leads to the concept of persistent rationalizability. It is shown that persistent rationalizability implies the backward induction procedure in generic games with perfect information. We next focus on persistently rationalizable types having beliefs with "minimal complexity", resulting in the concept of minimal rationalizability. For two-player simultaneous move games, minimal rationalizability is equivalent to the concept of Nash equilibrium strategy. In every outside option game, as defined by van Damme (1989) , minimal rationalizability uniquely selects the forward induction outcome.
Introduction
In the epistemic approach to noncooperative games every player is modeled as a decision maker under uncertainty, endowed with a preference ordering on the possible strategy choices. Under the assumption that each player is of the expected utility type, such preference orderings may be represented by a utility function over the possible consequences and a subjective probability distribution, or belief, over the uncertain parameters in the game. Most episternic models that have been proposed in the literature assume that the players face no uncertainty about the opponents' utility functions. This property is usually modeled by the presence of an exogenously given profile of utility functions and the implicit requirement that, whatever happens in the game, these utility functions are never to be questioned. The uncertainty faced by a player at a given instance of the game will then consist of the opponents' strategy choices, the opponents' beliefs about the other players' strategy choices, the opponents' beliefs about the other players' beliefs about the other players' strategy choices, and so forth.
Within a given epistemic model for games, the problem of how to model rational behavior cannot be reduced to one-person decision theory since a player should not only choose rationally given his beliefs, but these beliefs should also be based upon the conjecture that his opponents choose rationally as well. Also should a player realize that each of his opponents will hold beliefs that are based upon the conjecture that the other players act rationally, and so on. This intuitive argument may be formalized by the notion of common belief of rationality, a concept that plays a central role in theories of rationality such as rationalizability (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) ), Nash equilibrium and all refinements thereof. Indeed, Tan and Werlang (1988) have shown that, within a formal epistemic model, the strategies that may be chosen rationally when there is common belief of rationality coincide exactly with the set of rationalizable strategies.
A fundamental problem arises, however, if the notion of common belief of rationality is to be applied to dynamic games, and no uncertainty about the utility functions is allowed. The difficulty is that there may be information sets in the game that cannot be reached if players were to act in accordance with common belief of rationality. Reny (1992 Reny ( , 1993 has shown that for the class of perfect information games, this phenomenon occus on a rather structural basis. A natural question which then arises is: how should a player revise his beliefs about the opponents' strategy choices and the opponents' beliefs if an information set is reached that contradicts common belief of rationality? At this stage, the player should conclude that there is at least one opponent who (a) did not act rationally given his beliefs, or (b) bases his beliefs upon the conjecture that some other player does not act rationally given his belief, or (c) believes that some other player believes that some other player acts irrationally, and so on. A concept of rationality should specify which of the above scenarios is to be viewed as "most plausible", thus imposing a restriction on how beliefs are to be revised at such "problematic" information sets.
In this paper we choose an alternative approach by allowing the players to revise their beliefs about the opponents' utility functions during the game, while insisting on common belief of rationality at every possible instance in the game (see Pema (2002) for a similar approach within an equilibrium framework). Accordingly, we develop an epistemic model in which every player, at each of his information sets, has uncertainty about the opponents' strategy choices, the opponents' utility functions, the opponents' first-order beliefs about the other players' strategy choices, the opponents' first-order beliefs about the other players' utility functions, the opponents' second-order beliefs about the other players' first-order beliefs, etcetera. This leads, for every player at each of his information sets, to an infinite hierarchy of preference relations.
Our first result is a representation theorem similar to Armbruster and Bbge (1979) , Bbge and Eisele (1979) and Mertens and Zamir (1985) which shows that the infinite preference hierarchies within our epistemic model can be handled elegantly by means of types. We then proceed by imposing some restrictions upon the types, eventually leading to the concept of persistent rationalizability. The first two requirements, updating consistency and belief revision consistency, are concerned with the belief updating and belief revision policies carried out by the types. Up--dating consistency simply states that Bayesian updating should be used whenever the observed behavior is still in accordance with the previously held beliefs. Belief revision consistency states that, whenever a player i type decides to revise his belief about player j's utility function, he should not change the relative utilities between two terminal nodes unless player i is sure that player j has decided to avoid one of these terminal nodes.
The third condition we impose on types, belief in sequential rationality, reflects the principle that, whatever happens in the game, a player should always interpret observed moves as rational ones. In particular, if a player i observes a move that would not have been optimal for an opponent j, were player i to keep his previously held belief about j ' s utility function, then player i should actually revise his belief about j ' s utilities in order to rationalize this move.
The last condition, utility consistency, states that the utility function of a type at a certain stage of the game should always be in accordance with the utility function he held at the beginning of the game. Types that, throughout the game, respect common belief (1) about the event that types are updating consistent, belief revision consistent and utility consistent, and (2) about the event that types believe in sequential rationality, are called persistently rationalizable. Strategies that may be chosen rationally by persistently rationalizable types are called persistently rationalizable strategies.
The literature usually assumes some exogenously given restrictions upon the players' utility functions, and the beliefs they have about the opponents' utilities, modeled by the specification of a fixed profile of utility functions. The implicit interpretation is that players are assumed to hold these utility tunctions, and are to believe throughout the game that the opponents hold the utility functions as specified by the profile. As to link the concept of persistent rationalizability to existing rationality concepts for given utility functions, we subsequently impose some exogenous restrictions upon the players' utility functions and beliefs about the opponents' utilities. In order to do so, we proceed as above by taking as given a profile u of utility functions, but a different interpretation shall now be attached to it. Players are required to hold the utility functions as specified by u, and to respect common belief about the event that players initially believe that opponents hold utility functions as given by u. Persistently rationalizable types that satisfy these additional requirements are said to be persistently rationalizable for u. We thus leave open the possibility that players may change their belief about the opponents' utilities as the game is under way, while requiring that the players' beliefs agree on the same profile of utility functions at the beginning of the game.
Having established the concept of persistent rationalizability for a given profile u of utility functions, our next step is to present a refinement that focusses on types holding beliefs that are "as simple as poss.ible". As to formalize the latter, we introduce the notion of the complexity of a type ti, which, loosely speaking, represents the total number of types that ti considers directly or indirectly in his theory about the game. More precisely, the complexity of a type ti first counts the number of types tj that ti attaches positive probability to in his beliefs throughout the game.
For each of these types tj, one counts the number of types that tj attaches positive probability to and that have not been counted already, and so on. By summing up all these types, one gets the total number of types that ti directly or indirectly refers to in his beliefs throughout the game, and this number is called the complexity of ti. For a given profile of utilRy functions u, we say that a type is minimally rationalizable for u if (1) it is persistently rationalizable for u, and (2) it has minimal complexity among all types that are persistently rationalizable for u. Accordingly, a strategy is called minimally rationalizable for u if it can be chosen rationally by a type that is minimally rationalizable for u.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents some preliminary definitions in extensive form games. In Section 3 we develop the epistemic framework that will be used as a basis for the rationalizability concepts. Section 4 lays out the concepts of persistent and minimal rationalizability, and discusses the relationship between proper rationalizability (Schuhmacher (1999) and Asheim (2001) ) and persistent rationalizability, it is also shown that for every profile of utility functions there exists at least one persistently rationalizable strategy for each player. Section 5 focusses on the relationship between persistent and minimal rationalizability on the one hand, and backward induction, Nash equilibrium and forward induction in outside option games on the other hand.
Extensive Form Structures
In this section we present the notation and some basic definitions in extensive form games that will be employed throughout this paper. The rules of the game are represented by an extensive form structure S consisting of a finite game tree, a finite set of players I, a finite collection Hi of information sets for each player i and at each information set hi E Hi a finite collection A(hi)
of actions for the player. The set of terminal nodes in S is denoted by Z, whereas H = t.JiEiH i denotes the collection of all information sets. We assume throughout that the extensive form structure satisfies perfect recall and that no chance moves occur. The latter assumption is not crucial for our analysis, but simplifies the presentation. Let Si denote the set of player i (pure) strategies, and let S = ×ielSi be the set of all strategy profiles.
Throughout the paper, we shall make the assumption that the extensive form structure is with observable deviators (see Battigalli (1996) , among others). In order to formalize this condition, we need the following definitions. For a given information set h, let S(h) be the set of strategy profiles that reach h. For a given player i, not necessarily the player who moves at h, let Si(h) be the set of strategies si that do not avoid h. We say that S is with observable deviators if S(h) = XielSi(h) for every information set h. That is, an information set h can only be avoided if there is at least one player who chooses a strategy that already avoids h by itself.
Epistemic Framework
In this section we formally model the players in an extensive form structure as decision makers under uncertainty. In order to do so, we first introduce some preliminary decision theoretic and epistemic concepts upon which this model shall be built.
Preference Hierarchies
The decision theoretic framework to be presented here is based on the models by Savage (1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963) for decision making under uncertainty. Let X be a compact metric space provided with some topology, and Y some finite set. Let z~(Y) denote the space of probability distributions on Y. By 9v(X, Y) we denote the set of all measurable functions f : X ~ ,~(Y) to which we shall refer as acts 1. The set X is to be interpreted as the space 1The definition of an act as we use it coincides with the notion of compound horse lottery in Anscombe and
Aumann (1963).
of relevant variables about which the decision maker has uncertainty, whereas Y represents the set of possible consequences. As such, A(Y) contains all objective lotteries on possible consequences. For a given act .f in 9r(X, Y) and x E X, let f(x) E A(Y) be the objective lottery induced by x on Y, and let f(x)(y) be the objective probability that f(x) assigns to consequence y. By 7~eu(x, Y) we denote the set of all nontrivial preference relations on .T'(X, Y) that are of the expected utility type, that is, for which is there is some probability distribution ~ on X and some nonconstant utility function u : Y ~ R such that act f is weakly preferred over act g if and only if
Here, Having established the model for individual decision making under uncertainty, we may now formalize an epistemic model for extensive form games in which players, at each of their information sets, have uncertainty about the opponents' strategy choices, uncertainty about the opponents' first-order preference relations (including their utility functions), uncertainty about the opponents' second-order preference relations, and so forth. This will eventually lead to the concept of preference hierarchies for players. The epistemic model combines elements from Epstein and Wang (1996) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) . Epstein and Wang (1996) propose a model for static' games in which players have uncertainty about the opponents' preference relations (possibly including the opponents' utility functions) and players may hold preference relations that do not conform to expected utility. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) , in turn, propose a model for dynamic games in which players hold expected utility preferences, players have no doubts about the opponents' utility functions but have uncertainty about the opponents' subjective probability distributions.
Consider some player i in an extensive form structure. Let h0 be the information set that coincides with the beginning of the game, and let H~' = Hi U {h0}. The primary source of uncertainty faced by player i at information set hi E H i concerns the strategy choices by his opponents. We may thus define the first-order space of uncertainty Xil(hi) by
Xil(h~) --S-i(h~),
where S-i(hi) = xj¢iSj(hi). If hi = h0, we set Sj(hi) ----Sj for all players j. Let Z(hi) be the set of terminal nodes that follow hi. Every player i strategy si E Si(hi) may now be identified with an act fs, : X~(hi) ~ Z(hi) assigning to every s-i e X~(hi) the terminal node z • Z(hi) reached by the strategy profile (si, s-i). Hence, every strategy si • Si(hi) corresponds to an act in f(X~(hi), Z(hi)). We assume that player i holds a nontrivial preference relation of the eu 1 expected utility type p~(hi) • P (X i (hi), Z(hi)). We refer to Pe~(X~(hi), Z(hi)) as the set of first-order preference relations for player i at hi.
At information set hi, player i does not only have uncertainty about the strategies chosen by the opponents, but also about the first-order preference relations held by his opponents at each of their information sets. The second-order space of uncertainty for player i at hi is therefore given by .,Z(hj))), which, together with the induced product topology, is again a compact metric space. By repeating this construction, We obtain an infinite sequence of "succesively richer" spaces of uncertainty, defined by
, j ~ j,,Z(hj))) for k > 2, which are all compact metric spaces.
i preference hierachy for player i at hi is a sequence pi(hi) = (p~(hi))keN where p~(hi) • 7Peu(Xi k (hi), Z(hi)) for all k. Hence, it specifies an infinite hierarchy of expected utility preference relations over succesively richer spaces of uncertainty. A vector Pi = (Pi(hi))h~eH~, specifying a preference hierarchy at each of player i information sets, is simply called a preference hierarchy for player i. Let Pi be the set of all preference hierarchies for player i.
Coherence of Preference Hierarchies
A preference hierarchy Pi is called coherent if it holds a sequence of preference relations that do not contradict one another at overlapping layers. Let P~ be the set of coherent preference hierarchies for player i, and let P-i = xj¢iPj be the set of all opponents' preference hierarchies. We do not only require that every preference hierarchy is coherent, but also that there be common belief among the players that all preference hierarchies are coherent. This may be formalized as follows. Let PC i = ×34,P~. Define the sets p~,l, p~,2, ... by
for k > 2. Define ~i = NkeNP~ for all players i. We say that p~,Oo is the set of preference hierarchies for player i which respect common belief of coherence. We now obtain the following representation result for infinite preference hierarchies respecting common belief of coherence. The result is similar in spirit to results in Armbruster and BSge (1979), BSge and Eisele (1979), Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Epstein and Wang (1996) .
L e m m a 3.2. For every player i, the space of preference hierarchies p~,oo respecting common

ClOG belief of coherence is homeomorphic to the space x hiEH~Ocu(S_i(hi) X P-~i ' Z(hi)).
Types, Common Belief and Complexity
In view of Lernma 3.2, we may identify each preference hierarchy Pi E P~'~ with a vector specifying at each information set hi E H i an expected utility preference relation (Pi(Pi, hi), ui(pi, hi)) where #i(pi,hi) is a probability measure on S-i(hi) × p_C,~ and ui(pi, hi) is a utility function from Z(hi) to the real numbers. A preference hierarchy Pi E p~,C~ is called a type for player i, and by T~ ----p~,oo we denote the set of all player i types. Hence, every type ti E Ti corresponds to a vector (~i(ti, hi).. ui(ti, hi))h, eH 7 where/~i(ti, hi) is a probability distribution on S-i (hi) x T-i and ui(ti, hi) is a utility function on Z(hi) for every information set hi • H i. Using Lemma 3.2, we thus obtain the; following representation result for types.
C o r o l l a r y 3.3. /~br every player i, the space ~ of player i types is homeomorphic to the space ×haEH~ 7~eu( s-i(hi) × T-i, Z(hi) ).
We now formalize what it means that a type respects common belief about the event that types have certain properties. In order to do so, we use the following definitions. For a given type ti, information set hi E H i , and opponent j, let Izi(ti, hil Tj) be the marginal of the probability distribution Izi(ti, hi) on the set of player j types. By
T~(t~, hi) = supp #~(ti, hil Tj)
we denote the set of player j types that ti attaches positive probability to at hi, whereas l)l(ti) = Uh, H: Tjl(t,, h,) is the set of player j types that ti attaches positive probability to somewhere in the game. For j --i, we define T~(ti) = {ti}. Let
Tl(ti) = OjelTjl(ti).
Hence, in some sense, Tl(ti) is the set of types that ti uses at the first level in his theory about the opponents' behavior and beliefs. In turn, the behavior of each of the types t in Tl(ti) is driven by the beliefs that t has about the other players' types throughout the game. More exactly, every t E Tl(ti) uses the set Tl(t) of types at a first level for his theory about the other players' behavior and beliefs. By
T2(ti)-~ U Tl(t) teTl(Q)
we denote the set of types that ti uses, at a first or second level, for his theory about the game.
By repeating this argument recursively, we obtain that
Tk(t') = ~J Ti(t) teT~-~(t~)
for k >_ 2 represents the set of types that ti uses, up to level k, in his theory about the game.
By T°~(ti) = t2keNTk(t~) we denote the set of types that t~ uses, directly or indirectly, for his theory about the opponents' strategy choices and beliefs, and upon which ti shall base his final decision. By
c(ti) = IT°°(ti)l
we denote the complexity of the type ti. Hence, it specifies how many different types are used by ti in his theory about the opponents' decisions and the opponents' beliefs. For every player j, let ~°°(ti) be the set of player j types in T°°(ti). Note that Ti°°(ti) may contain more types than ti, since ti may believe that his opponents believe that player i has some other type than ti. Now, let T C_ xjeiTj be some set of profiles of types, or, simply, and event. We say that type t~ respects common belief about T if T°°(ti) C_ T. That is, in his theory about the opponents' behavior and the opponents' beliefs, type ti only uses, directly or indirectly, types that belong to T. Or, in other words, ti believes that all opponents' types belong to T, believes that all opponents' types believe that all the other players' types belong to T, and so forth.
Persistent and Minimal Rationalizability
P e r s i s t e n t R a t i o n a l i z a b i l i t y
In the concept of persistent rationalizability we impose four conditions on types, to which we refer as common belief about updating consistency, utility consistency, belief revision consistency and belief in sequential rationality. Types that satisfy these requirements are called persistently rationalizable, and strategies that are sequentially optimal for a persistently rationalizable type are called persistently rationalizable strategies.
In the previous section, we have seen that every type ti E ~ corresponds to a vector (pi(ti, hi), ui(ti, hi) )hieH~ , where pi(ti, hi) is a probability measure on S-i(hi) x T-i and ui(ti, hi) is a utility function on Z(hi) for every information set hi E H i • Updating consistency states that, whenever the game moves from a player i information set h~ to another player i information set h~, player i should derive his new belief/zi(ti,hi 2) from his old belief tzi (ti, hi 1 
#i(tl,
= #i(ti, h )(S_i(hi2) x T-i) for a11 events E C S_i(hi 2) x T-i, whenever #i(ti, h~)(S-i(hi 2) x T-i) > O.
Utility consistency simply states that the utility function of a type should be time-consistent in the sense that his utility function at some later stage in the game should not contradict his utility function earlier on in the game.
Definition 4.2. A type ti is called utility consistent if ui(ti, hi) = ui(ti, ho)iz(h~) for a11 hi E H~.
Here, ui(ti, ho)iz(h,) denotes the restriction of ui(ti, ho) on the terminal nodes following hi.
While updating consistency states how to change the belief when the observed behavior is still in accordance with the previously held beliefs, belief revision consistency imposes a condition upon the players' belief revision policies when the observed behavior contradicts the previous beliefs. In words, the condition states that, whenever player i at some information set hi is led to revise his beliefs about some opponent j's utility function, then he should not change his belief about j's relative utilities between two terminal nodes unless i is certain that j has decided to avoid one of these nodes. More precisely, if player i finds himself at hi, then, by the observable deviators property, player i knows that opponent j has chosen some strategy in Sj(hi), without knowing which one;. Let Zj(hi) be the set of terminal nodes that may be reached by strategies in Sj(hi). Hence, the event of reaching information set hi only tells player i that player j has decided to avoid terminal nodes that are not in Zj(hi). Belief revision consistency then states that player i may only revise his belief about j's relative utilities between two nodes if at least one of these nodes is not in Zj(hi). We finally define belief in sequential rationality. For a given strategy si, let H~(si) be the Set of information sets in H~' that are not avoided by si. A strategy-type pair (si,ti) E Six is called sequentially rational if at every information set hi E H~(si), we have that ~i(si,td hd = max ~(s~,til hd.
• Here, ui (si, ti[ hi) denotes the expected utility induced by strategy si with respect to the probability distribution mrg(
#i(ti , hi)I S-i(hi) ) E A(S-i(hi)
) and the utility function ui(ti, hi). Let (Si x ~)sr be the set of sequentially rational strategy-type pairs, and let (S-i x T_i) 8r = xj~i(Sj X Tj) st. By T~ r = {ti E Til supp#i(ti, hi) C (S-i x T_i) sr for every hi E Hi} we denote the set of those player i types that believe in sequential rationality. 
Exogenous Restrictions on Utility Functions and Beliefs
In the literature, it is usually assumed that there be common belief about the players' actual utility functions throughout the game, and these utility functions are usually modeled as being part of the extensive form game itself. Indeed, an extensive form game is normally defined as a pair (8,u) , where S is an extensive form structure and u = (ui)iel is a profile of utility functions, the interpretation being that at any stage of the game, there is common belief about u. Therefore, if we wish to compare our concept of persistent rationalizability to other rationalizability concepts proposed in the literature, we should formalize what it means in our model that players "face an exogenously given profile of utility functions", while allowing these players to revise their belief about the opponents' utility functions as the game proceeds.
Let $ be an extensive form structure and u = (Ui)iel an exogenously given profile of utility functions. We say that a type ti initially believes u if pi(ti, h0) assigns probability one to the event that every opponent j has some type tj with uj(tj, hi) = ujiz(h~ ) for all h i E H~. 
Minimal Rationallzability
We shall next focus on types that are persistently rationalizable for a given extensive form game (,S, u), and, moreover, have a complexity that is as small as possible. Recall from Section 3.3 that the complexity of'a type ti denotes the total number of types that ti uses in his theory about the opponents. Reducing the complexity of a persistently rationalizable type ti to a minimum typically implies that ti should involve as few belief revisions as possible during the course of the game. The reason is that belief revisions typically increase the complexity of a type. In order to see this, note that a belief revision is necessary whenever ti, at some information set h~, holds some belief about the possible types of opponent j, and discovers at a later information set h/2 that none of these types could have chosen a strategy leading to hi 2 that is in accordance with common belief of sequential rationality. In such a case, ti should include new player j types to his theory, at least at a first level, in order to explain the event of reaching information set hi 2, and this will typically increase tlhe complexity of ti.
Moreover, minimizing the complexity of a type ti also typically implies that ti should restrict his attention, in his theory about the opponents, as much as possible to types that use few belief revisions. The reason should be clear: if ti, directly or indirectly, uses a type tj with many belief revisions in his theory, then tj's complexity will typically be large, which in turn would contribute to a larger complexity of type ti.
Existence and Relation to Proper Rationalizability
Schuhmacher (1999) introduced the concept of proper rationalizabily as some non-equilibrium analogue to proper equilibrium, and showed that it uniquely selects the backward induction strategies in generic games with perfect information. Subsequently, Asheim (2001) provided a characterization of proper rationalizability in terms of lexicographic beliefs for the case of two players, which can 'be extended to games with more than two players. Asheim's characterization states, in words, that a properly rationalizable type should respect common belief about the event that (1) types take all opponents' strategies into account, and (2) types deem one opponent strategy infinitely more likely than some other strategy whenever the opponent prefers the former over the latter. We show that for a given extensive form structure S and profile u of utility functions, every properly rationalizable strategy for (,S, u) is persistently rationalizable for ($, u). Since properly rationalizable strategies always exist for every (S, u), this result implies the existence of persistently rationalizable strategies for every (S, u).
Theorem 4.7. Let S be an extensive form structure with observable deviators and u ---( ui )i~l a profile of utility ftmctions. Then, every properly rationafizable strategy for (S, u) is persistently rationalizable for (.S, u).
Relation to Other Concepts
Backward Induction
In this section we will see that in generic games with perfect information, every player has a unique persistently rationalizable strategy, namely his backward induction strategy. A game with perfect information (S, u) is said to be in generic position if for every player i and every pair zl, z2 of different terminal nodes, we have that ui(zl) ~ ui(z2). For such a game, let a*(hi) E A(hi) denote the unique backward induction action at information set hi. For every player i, there is a unique strategy s~ with sT(hi) = a*(hi) for all hi E Hi(sT), to which we shall refer as the backward induction strategy. In view of Theorem 5.1, the concept of persistent rationalizability may be employed as an alternative epistemic foundation for backward induction in games with perfect information. There is an important difference with other foundations proposed in the literature, such as Aumann (1995), Samet (1996) , Balkenborg and Winter (1997) , Stalnaker (1998) and Asheim (2000) , as persistent rationalizability allows players to revise their conjectures about the opponents' utility functions during the game, whereas the latter foundations do not. In turn, persistent rationalizability requires players to interpret "unexpected moves" (in this case, moves that deviate from the backward induction play) always as being in accordance with common belief of rationality.
Nash Equilibrium Strategies
In Section 4, we have defined minimally rationalizable types for ($, u) as those persistently rationalizable types for (S, u) that have minimal complexity. Recall that the complexity of a: type ti denotes the total number of types that ti, directly or indirectly, uses in his theory about the opponents' strategy choices and opponents' beliefs. It turns out that the minimal complexity criterion has non-trivial implications even for the class of simultaneous move games in which belief revision plays no role. In these games, persistent rationalizability is equivalent to rationalizability, as defined in Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) . Minimal rationalizability thus restricts attention to those strategies by player i that can be justified by an epistemic rationalizability theory (cf. Tan and Werlang (1988) ) which involves as few types as possible. We prove that for the case of two-player simultaneous move games, this concept is equivalent to the notion of Nash equilibrium strategies.
In order to formalize this result, we first need the definition of a Nash equilibrium strategy.
For a given two-person simultaneous move game, a first-order belief about player i is a probability distribution #i E A(Si), reflecting player j's belief about player i's strategy choice. A profile (#1, #2) of first-order beliefs is a Nash equilibrium if #i(si) > 0 implies that si is a best response against #j. A strategy si is a Nash equilibrium strategy if there is some Nash equilibrium (#1, #2)
such that si is a best response against #j. Since not every rationalizable strategy in a two-player game is a Nash equilibrium strategy, the following result implies that minimal rationalizability is indeed stronger than rationalizability in two-player simultaneous move games.
T h e o r e m 5.2. Let ($, u) be a two-player simultaneous move game. Then, si is minimally rationalizable for (S, u) if and only if si is a Nash equilibrium strategy for ($, u).
The characterization result no longer holds for more than two players, since in this case a minimally rationalizable strategy need no longer be a Nash equilibrium strategy.
Forward I n d u c t i o n in Outside Option Games
In the class of so-called outside option games, the concept of minimal rationalizability singles out the unique forward induction outcome, as defined in van Damme (1989) . An outside option game is a two-player game ($, u) with the following properties:
(1) At the beginning, player 1 may choose an outside option and leave the game or not choose the outside option and stay in the game; actions that will be denoted by Out and In, respectively. (2) When taking the outside option, player 1 receives utility ul(Out).
(3) If player 1 does not take the outside option, players 1 and 2 enter a simultaneous move games with action sets A1 and A2. In this subgame, there is a strict Nash equilibrium (a~,a~) which yields player I utility Ul (a~, a~) > ul(Out). All other Nash equilibria (#1, #2) in first-order beliefs yield player 1 an expected utility strictly lower than ul (Out).
In van Damme (1989) it is argued that (In, at) and a~ are the unique "forward induction strategies" in this game. The argument runs as follows. If player 2 observes that player 1 has not chosen the outside option, he should conclude that player 1 is heading for the only Nash equilibrium that dominates the outside option for him, that is, (a~, a~). As such, he should believe that player 1 will play a~, and hence player 2 should respond with a~. Player 1, anticipating on player 2 reasoning in this way, should therefore choose (In, a~). The following theorem shows that this argument is supported by the concept of minimal rationalizability.
